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KEEPING SETTLEMENTS SECRET 
ERIK S. KNUTSEN*
ABSTRACT
 This Article explores the tensions between the perceived public and private aspects of the 
litigation system by using the debate surrounding whether or not the public civil justice sys-
tem can and should tolerate secret settlements in standard, nonaggregate private law dis-
putes. By evaluating the arguments against secret settlements in this context, the Article ar-
gues that the public and private aspects are not exclusory, oppositional perspectives but in-
stead lie on a nonlinear continuum in which both may inform the other. The proper place on 
the continuum on which a certain procedural solution may lie often depends upon what type 
of dispute is at the center of the debate. When reforming and designing the civil justice sys-
tem, either in whole or in part—like whether or not to allow secret settlements—one can ex-
pect a fuller, more balanced normative dialogue by thinking of the private and public views 
of civil litigation as operating on a nonexclusive and nonlinear continuum. This Article 
delves behind the seemingly oppositional perspectives of the public and private conceptions 
of civil litigation to reveal the utility of thinking about the two not as exclusive but cohesive. 
A decidedly private view of secret settlements does not, in all instances, negate the concerns 
of a view closer toward the public side of the continuum. In the end, the private view of liti-
gation often has far more “public” to the “private” than one might expect.  
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 The civil justice system operates by maintaining multiple levels of 
secrecy. Lawyer-client privilege, litigation privilege, settlement privi-
lege, judicial pretrial conferences, and confidential mediations are all 
cornerstones of the adversarial civil litigation process. They are de-
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signed, in one way or another, to protect a party’s right to prosecute 
his or her case as he or she sees fit. 
 Yet the civil justice system is often touted as a “public” dispute 
resolution system. The system uses public resources to fund judges, 
courthouses, and the administrative machinery behind them. The 
end product of litigation may be a written judicial decision with pre-
cedential value to other future litigants. Judicial precedent also has 
the potential to modify undesirable behavior of nonlitigants who can 
arrange their affairs in the shadow of the law. The civil justice sys-
tem itself is supposed to be transparent and, if possible, apolitical.  
 How are the perceived values embedded in the civil justice system 
reconciled when a dispute settles confidentially? The vast majority of 
cases that settle require as a condition of settlement that the litigat-
ing parties keep some aspect of the settlement a secret.1 To complete 
a settlement for a typical civil case, parties generally execute a writ-
ten settlement agreement. A standard term in such agreements is a 
confidentiality clause that stipulates what the parties can and cannot 
disclose about the settlement. These “secret settlements” often re-
quire confidentiality regarding the identity of the parties, the settle-
ment amount, or other specific facts.2 How is it that a dispute resolu-
tion system that prides itself on being public can tolerate secrecy at 
the settlement stage of a dispute occurring within the public justice 
system? The tensions between “public” rights and “private” rights are 
strongest when a dispute concludes in a “secret” settlement.  
 This Article reinvigorates the debate between these two perspec-
tives about public and private rights in civil litigation by arguing 
that the two perspectives, by operating on a nonexclusive, nonlinear 
continuum, are not as oppositional as one might believe.3 The key is 
                                                                                                                    
 1. Most cases in the civil litigation system settle. Most also settle in secrecy. Al-
though settlement rate estimates for civil cases vary, they generally point toward the 96% 
range. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial Promotion and 
Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1341 (1994) (concluding that most cases 
settle “in the shadow of the law” without judicial intervention but use the rule of law as 
predictor for outcomes). See also Laurie Kratky Doré, Secrecy By Consent: The Use and 
Limits of Confidentiality in the Pursuit of Settlement, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 283, 384 
(1999) (discussing that many cases settle without any court involvement whatsoever). 
 2. Doré, supra note 1, at 385-86. 
 3. Indeed, Minna J. Kotkin has described the past academic debate over confidential 
settlement agreements as having “the sides sharply drawn” between the public and private 
views of these procedural tools. See Minna J. Kotkin, Invisible Settlements, Invisible Discrim-
ination, 84 N.C. L. REV. 927, 946 (2006). However, Leandra Lederman has come closest to re-
cognizing the non-oppositional characteristics of public and private elements of settlement. In 
examining the public need for legal precedents as a product of litigation and the private need 
for settlement as resolution of expensive disputes, Lederman argues that these two needs 
must somehow be balanced in the civil dispute resolution system.  This article pushes her ar-
guments past the realm of precedent versus settlement and instead argues that these public 
and private qualities exist on a continuum, as opposed to being bipolar, oppositional aspects. 
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to see the “public” in the “private view” and the “private” in the “pub-
lic view” and then evaluate the merits of one end of the continuum 
over the other, depending on the procedural context one is trying to 
analyze. In some instances, such as securities fraud class actions in 
which decisionmaking in litigation operates very differently than it 
does in private tort or contract lawsuits because of the more “public” 
aspects of the dispute, it may be appropriate to design a civil dispute 
resolution system with a more balanced public-private perspective. 
However, for the typical two party private law dispute, a view of the 
civil litigation system closer on the continuum toward the private 
view actually addresses an array of concerns previously associated 
exclusively with the public view of litigation. 
 The Article therefore offers a framework through which one can 
view not only the civil justice system but scholarly perspectives on 
that system as well. Past scholarship has often divided largely along 
the public-private lines. This Article explores the tensions between 
the perceived public and private aspects of the litigation system by 
focusing on the current debate about whether or not the “public” civil 
justice system can and should tolerate secret settlements. By eva-
luating the arguments against secret settlements, the Article argues 
that, in typical two party disputes over private rights, the public 
rights inherent in the system must necessarily be secondary in prior-
ity to the private rights of the individual litigants. To do otherwise 
would upset the balance of the adversarial method that is the be-
drock of the civil justice system. The system has some public aspects, 
but when such aspects attempt to trump private dispute settlement 
concerns in all contexts and for all claims, the very public values 
sought to be protected are actually jeopardized. Thus, the oper- 
ation of the civil justice system, and simultaneously the perspec- 
tives from which one evaluates that operation, lie on a continuum be-
tween a public rights oriented perspective and private rights oriented 
perspective. The appropriate blend of public and private interests  
on that continuum often depends on what type of dispute is before 
the court. 
 This Article uses one procedural concept—secret settlements in 
typical private law disputes—to explore and evaluate the limits and 
effectiveness of this seemingly oppositional continuum. Such an ex-
ploration can inform debates about just how far toward “public-
oriented” or “private-oriented” any future civil justice reforms should 
swing. The Article posits—likely to the surprise of most readers—that 
along the public-private continuum for standard private law dis-
putes, the private, party-centric view of the system is actually the 
                                                                                                                    
See Leandra Lederman, Precedent Lost: Why Encourage Settlement, and Why Permit Non-
party Involvement in Settlements?, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 221 (1999). 
948 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:945 
more effective perspective from which to design an all-encompassing 
civil justice system that preserves private rights and also protects 
some valuable public interest rights. Therefore, it is essential to ac-
knowledge this inverse relationship along the continuum of the pub-
lic view and the private view when one is considering reforms to the 
system, such as whether to foster or ban secret settlements. 
 Part I of this Article begins by mapping the scope of the discus-
sion, explaining the public-private continuum and this Article’s 
choice of the typical private law dispute as the lens through which to 
view the continuum. The Article then discusses what a secret settle-
ment is, how it operates, and how secret settlements are used by both 
defendants and plaintiffs in civil litigation. Part II of this Article 
canvasses the continuum of what appear to be two opposing views of 
the purpose of the civil justice system: the public view and the pri-
vate view. These views, however, are not exactly oppositional and ex-
clusive, but instead operate on a continuum and may shift the blend 
of public and private depending upon the type of dispute examined 
and the type of procedural mechanism behind the dispute. The Ar-
ticle explores how public law perspective proponents like David Lu-
ban,4 Owen Fiss,5 and Abram Chayes6 have developed largely ideolog-
ically weighted, results-based, public-centric views about secret set-
tlements that may lead to some untenable conclusions when applied 
to standard, private law disputes. In this line of thinking, the liti-
gants themselves take second seat to the public interest and, more 
curiously, the public interest and the litigants’ interests appear to be 
presented as ideologically opposite.  
 Instead, the Article argues that approaches to the civil litigation 
system closer to the rights-driven, more party-centric end of the con-
tinuum such as those taken by Arthur Miller,7 Carrie Menkel-
Meadow,8 and Christopher Drahozal and Laura Hines9 actually do a 
better job of balancing both private and public interests in the system 
itself when designing procedural mechanisms for standard private 
law disputes. Part III reviews key public view criticisms about secret 
settlements and demonstrates that the solution to these criticisms is 
actually better informed by a perspective closer to the private view of 
                                                                                                                    
 4. David Luban, Settlements and the Erosion of the Public Realm, 83 GEO. L.J.  
2619 (1995).  
 5. Owen M. Fiss, Against Settlement, 93 YALE L.J. 1073 (1984). 
 6. Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARV. L. REV.
1281 (1976). 
 7. Arthur R. Miller, Confidentiality, Protective Orders, and Public Access to the 
Courts, 105 HARV. L. REV. 427 (1991). 
 8. Carrie Menkel-Meadow, Whose Dispute Is It Anyway?: A Philosophical and Demo-
cratic Defense of Settlement (In Some Cases), 83 GEO. L.J. 2663 (1995). 
 9. Christopher R. Drahozal & Laura J. Hines, Secret Settlement Restrictions and Un-
intended Consequences, 54 KAN. L. REV. 1457 (2006). 
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litigation for most private law disputes. The public view postulates 
that secret settlements defy transparency, do not contribute to the 
public good, perpetuate danger, take advantage of vulnerable liti-
gants, and should not be used in litigation where the government is a 
party. However, the private view of secret settlements turns the pub-
lic view criticisms upside-down and exposes the problematic, exclu-
sively public nature of the public view such that the norms of the 
public view are not nearly as achievable in actual operation as one 
might otherwise expect at first blush.  
 Part IV of this Article concludes by noting the importance of un-
derstanding the nonexclusive relationship between two seemingly 
oppositional viewpoints that exist not as absolutes but on a conti-
nuum. Depending on the type of case (i.e., civil rights versus a slip 
and fall case) and the amount of public procedural safeguards al-
ready installed in the procedural matrix (i.e., certification for class 
actions or judicial approval of settlements), it is more helpful to ana-
lyze procedural reforms based on either a more public or private 
view, or perhaps something somewhere in the middle of the conti-
nuum. For example, when reforming and designing the civil justice 
system for standard, nonaggregate private law litigation, one can ex-
pect a fuller, more balanced normative dialogue by using a perspec-
tive closer to the private view of the continuum. In the end, the pri-
vate view of litigation often has far more “public” to the “private” 
than one might expect.  
I.   WHAT ARE SECRET SETTLEMENTS?
A.   Secret Settlements in Standard, Nonaggregate Private Law Dis-
putes 
 This Article discusses settlements in the civil justice system only. 
To more coherently delve into the dynamics of the public and private 
views of civil litigation, this Article restricts its analysis to common 
civil settlements that operate in the standard, nonaggregate litiga-
tion setting. This includes typical tort, contractual, and property dis-
putes between parties, such as an automobile accident, a commercial 
deal gone sour between suppliers, a dispute about property between 
neighbors, or a products liability lawsuit between consumer and 
manufacturer. However, while not the focus of this Article, it is use-
ful to note that in aggregate litigation situations, such as mass torts 
or class actions, the balance between public and private may tip to-
wards the public end of the spectrum.  
 Aggregate litigation involves a more complex process and departs 
from the traditional procedural landscape of the simple private law 
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dispute.10 Indeed, there is a great deal of “public” purposely injected 
into the class action’s special procedures because of the need to safe-
guard the rights of class members who must operate in a very differ-
ent decisionmaking capacity than those plaintiffs in a standard two-
party lawsuit (i.e., class certification and judicial settlement ap-
proval).11 Settlement in aggregate litigation, therefore, may be a 
unique hybrid situation where decidedly stronger public interests are 
necessarily implicated because the settlement involves a multidi-
mensional decision on behalf of a great many litigants who exercise 
little control over the lawsuit.12 Therefore, to more fully explore the 
fundamental tensions between how the public and private views op-
erate on a continuum and perhaps inform each other, this Article 
uses as its primary focus the typical tort, contractual, or property 
claim between two parties: plaintiff and defendant. How and where 
to place the more “public law” oriented cases on the continuum such 
as civil rights or the aggregate litigation situation is left for another 
day. The point of this Article is to delve into the seemingly opposi-
tional perspectives of public and private views to reveal the utility of 
thinking about the two not as exclusive, but as cohesive and comple-
mentary. A decidedly private view of secret settlements does not, in 
all instances, negate the concerns of a view closer toward the public 
side of the continuum. 
B.   Secret Settlements Revealed 
 A secret settlement is a settlement of a civil dispute about which 
some aspect has been agreed upon by the parties to remain confiden-
tial. The legal vehicle for this is typically a contractual agreement 
with a clause where the parties promise to keep some or all of the 
settlement details secret. Secrecy could refer to any aspect of the set-
tlement. Most often, parties agree to keep one or more of the follow-
ing a secret: 
a) the identity of the parties; 
b) the amount of the settlement; 
c) the admission or denial of fault by one or more parties;  
                                                                                                                    
 10. See, e.g., Judith Resnik, Aggregation, Settlement, and Dismay, 80 CORNELL L.
REV. 918 (1995) (discussing the movement in class actions away from a model of individual 
adjudication toward a model of mass administrative processing of claims and settlements). 
Resnik, however, questions whether the settlement dynamic is indeed all that different be-
tween the class action and the individual case. Id. at 938. She concludes that more empiri-
cal evidence is needed to determine whether this is true. Id. 
 11. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, Securities Class Actions as Pragmatic Ex 
Post Regulation, 43 GA. L. REV. 63, 106-11 (2008) (noting the importance of transparency 
and public values in the securities class action context). 
 12. See, e.g., Elizabeth Chamblee Burch, CAFA’s Impact on Litigation as a Public 
Good, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 2517, 2548 (2008) (noting how aggregate litigation affects public 
norms, especially at the settlement phase). 
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d) facts relating to the loss; or 
e) sensitive financial or trade information.13
 The effective clause in the settlement agreement could be quite 
simple, such as “the terms of this settlement shall remain confiden-
tial.” The clause may include exceptions to the agreed-upon secrecy. 
Such exceptions can exclude confidentiality obligations for a party’s 
communications with immediate family members, lawyers, accoun-
tants, the government, or for the purposes of obtaining therapy. The 
clause could also include certain conditions in which secrecy is al-
lowed to be broken—for example, if a court must review the agree-
ment or if other legal obligations arise. Finally, the clause could de-
tail the sanctions for breaking secrecy, such as whether the breach of 
secrecy constitutes a fundamental breach of the settlement, thereby 
voiding the contract. Alternatively, there may be liquidated damages 
clauses for breaches of secrecy that detail precisely how much is to be 
paid upon breach.14 None of these conditions appear to be common in 
standard settlement agreements at present.  
C.   Why Use Secret Settlements? 
1.   Defendants 
 Defendants use secret settlements in civil lawsuits to create value 
in the settlement.15 There is a price for secrecy. A defendant is often 
willing to pay more to a plaintiff if the plaintiff keeps some terms of 
the settlement confidential. Secret settlements are frequently used 
for products liability cases, medical negligence, employment cases, 
and cases involving physical and emotional abuse.16 Defendants use 
confidentiality as a bargaining chip to avoid two potentially detri-
mental outcomes: negative publicity and future lawsuits.17 If a defen-
dant can suppress information about the settlement, such informa-
tion is unlikely to find its way into a public forum and the media. 
This creates value for a defendant. The reasons could be varied, the 
most obvious of which is to avoid dissemination of any information 
regarding a defendant’s potential fault or wrongdoing. There is also a 
strong incentive to suppress the fact that the defendant was sued, re-
gardless of fault or wrongdoing. The presence of a lawsuit alone can 
often create aspersions of fault when no fault, in fact, exists. This can 
damage the defendant’s reputation and client base.  
                                                                                                                    
 13. Doré, supra note 1, at 385-86. 
 14. Id. at 386. 
 15. See generally id.; Drahozal & Hines, supra note 9; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8. 
 16. See, e.g., Drahozal & Hines, supra note 9, at 1457-58. 
 17. See, e.g., Hon. Jack B. Weinstein, Secrecy in Civil Trials: Some Tentative Views, 9 
J.L. & POL’Y 53, 56 (2000). 
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 The defendant will also usually want to keep confidential the facts 
about any payments to the plaintiff. There are many reasons, unrelated 
to any admission of fault, why a defendant might settle a lawsuit with a 
plaintiff. If, however, information about a payment or settlement is dis-
seminated, the public can infer, rightly or wrongly, that there must have 
been some fault on the part of the defendant. In reality, the dispute may 
have settled for reasons wholly unrelated to fault. The defendant, for 
example, could have decided it was less costly to settle the dispute than 
fight about the merits. Defendants may also use secret settlements to 
protect proprietary information, such as trade or business secrets dis-
covered in the process of the litigation. Confidential settlement agree-
ments avoid these negative, costly, and often incorrect, public exposures 
for defendants. To a defendant, the contractual opportunity to bargain 
for secrecy about some element of the dispute often has value. It is an 
important part of the dynamics of settlement. 
2.   Plaintiffs 
 Plaintiffs also use confidential settlement agreements to create 
value in settlement negotiations.18 Plaintiffs can capitalize on the 
value of secrecy to defendants and increase available settlement op-
tions. A secret settlement is often worth more to a defendant than a 
settlement with no disclosure restrictions. A plaintiff will therefore 
have one more aspect of the case, beyond allegations of fault, with 
which to bargain.  
 Theoretically, it could be possible that a plaintiff’s only bargaining 
chip in a dispute is secrecy itself.19 Imagine a case in which the plain-
tiff either has limited evidence of a defendant’s fault20 or, as would be 
more common, it is too risky and expensive for a plaintiff to gamble on 
a trial to prove fault. The plaintiff at least has the option to bargain for 
secrecy if a particular defendant values secrecy to any degree. 
 Plaintiffs also use confidential settlement agreements because, as 
with defendants, privacy can be paramount in certain disputes. 
Plaintiffs may want to keep their identities secret. There could be 
sensitive reputational information at stake in a lawsuit, such as in a 
wrongful dismissal case. Plaintiffs could also be concerned about in-
timate privacy issues that were disclosed in the lawsuit, such as med-
ical or family information. Victimization concerns could also be pa-
                                                                                                                    
 18. See id.
 19. For example, consider an instance where the plaintiff has a difficult task of prov-
ing an essential element in the claim and is woefully out-lawyered and out-financed by a 
defendant. If secrecy is of great value to a defendant, that defendant may not even wish to 
risk any pretrial wranglings such as a motion for summary judgment, as such would put 
the facts squarely in the public eye.  
 20. For example, complex evidence about causation in a tort trial which might not 
equate to a balance of probabilities. 
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ramount where the dispute concerns alleged wrongdoings that are 
emotionally damaging to the plaintiff. A plaintiff may want to keep 
all details of such a dispute confidential.  
 Lastly, like defendants, plaintiffs may often want to keep the 
monetary value of the settlement a secret. If the amount of the set-
tlement is large, plaintiffs may be concerned about the undue and 
unwanted attention that a sudden financial influx may bring.21 Se-
cret settlements avoid this problem. Conversely, if the amount of the 
settlement is not large, a plaintiff may be concerned that the public 
may view her settled dispute as frivolous or unsuccessful (even if, in 
fact, it is not). The public has a skewed perception of settlement val-
ue and is unable to evaluate the efficacies of civil settlements. There 
could be multiple reasons why the monetary amount of a settlement 
is not large, yet the plaintiff still considers the settlement a success. 
The plaintiff may have bargained to implement organizational 
changes with the defendant. Perhaps the plaintiff’s case was nearly 
impossible or too expensive to prove in court, and some settlement 
amount would be better than a court-sanctioned cost award after a 
failed trial. The public is not exposed to the settlement dynamics that 
went into the agreement between the parties. To avoid public scorn 
in instances where the public’s expected outcome differs from the 
plaintiff’s actual monetary outcome, the plaintiff may wish to keep 
the settlement amount confidential.  
 Plaintiffs and defendants alike use confidential settlement agree-
ments to achieve goals that the otherwise simplistic monetization22 of 
the dispute cannot solve. As discussed later, secret settlements can 
be used as effective value-creation tools that benefit both plaintiffs 
and defendants in certain circumstances.23 Removing such tools from 
the settlement negotiation toolbox hampers parties in their efforts to 
resolve disputes using non-monetary approaches. Secret settlements 
thus have the potential to engineer social outcomes that provide ad-
ditional value to the settlement. 
                                                                                                                    
 21. For example, a long-lost family member suddenly appears, looking for a cash handout. 
 22. See Luban, supra note 4, at 2646 (discussing how the “monetization” of civil litiga-
tion disputes has flattened the “normative landscape” of the public view of litigation); cf. 
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 2674 (arguing that litigation, not settlement, has led to 
the monetization of disputes). 
 23. Scholars of negotiation and alternative dispute resolution have for the past few 
decades trumpeted the importance of nonmonetary value creation in creatively solving civil 
disputes. See, e.g., ROGER FISHER & WILLIAM URY, GETTING TO YES (Bruce Patton ed. 
1991); DAVID A. LAX & JAMES K. SEBENIUS, THE MANAGER AS NEGOTIATOR: BARGAINING
FOR COOPERATION AND COMPETITIVE GAIN (1986). 
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II.   THE PUBLIC AND PRIVATE VIEWS OF SECRET SETTLEMENTS (AND 
THE CIVIL JUSTICE SYSTEM)
 How anyone views the efficacy of secret settlements in the civil 
justice system depends on how one views the role of the civil justice 
system in general.24 That view also necessarily drives whether or not 
one argues to curb, ban, or foster secret settlements. In the past, 
scholars have presented what often appear to be two competing views 
as to how the civil justice system as a whole operates and should op-
erate: the public view and the private view.25 Unpacking these two 
views through the lens of secret settlements in standard private law 
disputes helps explain the real debate behind how one sculpts a nor-
mative perspective of the civil justice system as a whole. That debate 
should focus not on oppositional ideals but on the fact that these 
perspectives actually operate on a continuum. The private view of 
civil litigation can (and as will be shown, often does) preserve some 
values inherent in the public view. The key is to recognize that these 
two views are not mutually exclusive when procedural matters are 
put into actual operation in the real world of litigation. 
A.   The Public View of Secret Settlements  
 The public view of the civil litigation system typically sees the sys-
tem as a publicly funded, open system operating with transparency to 
engineer greater social good.26 Litigation and court decisions contribute 
to the public commons and enrich social debate through dispute reso-
lution. Those who hold tight to the public view of civil litigation are ei-
ther against the notion of confidential settlement agreements alto-
gether or clamor for increasing regulation of secret settlements. 
 The public view of civil litigation owes its genesis to those scholars 
who see the civil litigation system, and indeed dispute resolution, as 
capable of transforming society into something better.27 Courts medi-
                                                                                                                    
 24. See, e.g., Doré, supra note 1, at 289 (contending that the question of “who owns a 
lawsuit” affects one’s stance on confidentiality in the litigation process).  
 25. For an excellent summary of the public and private views in relation to secrecy in 
the discovery process, see Jack H. Friedenthal, Secrecy in Civil Litigation: Discovery and 
Party Agreements, 9 J.L. & POL’Y 67, 69 (2000) (describing the two positions as being on 
“two quite different levels, one involving philosophical concepts of the role of the courts in 
society and the other concerning the practical effects of disclosure or nondisclosure on par-
ties to disputes and to the public at large”). 
 26. See Fiss, supra note 5 (arguing that American’s litigation system should operate in 
the public sphere and that settlements remove valuable public discourse); Luban, supra note 
4 (stating that settlement and litigation are primarily about promoting public values); 
Chayes, supra note 6 (describing an emerging model of “public law litigation,” in which pri-
vate lawsuits concern the operation of public policy instead of merely private rights between 
disputants); Lloyd Doggett & Michael J. Mucchetti, Public Access to Public Courts: Discou-
raging Secrecy in the Public Interest, 69 TEX. L. REV. 643 (1991) (arguing in favor of TEX. R.
CIV. P. 76(a), which makes public access to court records the standard rule for courts). 
 27. See Luban, supra note 4; Fiss, supra note 5; Chayes, supra note 6. 
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ate a social and political dialog, performing an integral service to the 
public at large. Court decisions perpetuate discussion about the 
boundaries of the law and provide a positive externality to the public: 
the deterrent effect of knowing what happened to who and what cost 
was borne. This is a decidedly public law-inspired vision of the civil 
litigation system. The detriments of secret settlements as catalogued 
by public view scholars lead such scholars to emphasize a balance 
toward public, not private, benefit, arguing that secret settlements 
hinder the values of the public litigation process. 
B.   The Private View of Secret Settlements 
 The private view of the civil litigation system sees the system as a 
party-driven mechanism for efficiently resolving private disputes be-
tween parties.28 Those who espouse the private view of civil litigation 
are often supportive of a disputing party’s opportunity to bargain 
with secrecy. Secret settlements are thus a positive dynamic in the 
civil litigation system.29
 The private view of civil litigation rests on the idea of party au-
tonomy in the adversary system.30 The parties within a dispute have 
complete control as to how the dispute is handled.31 Further, the dis-
puting parties themselves choose to bring a dispute into the public 
justice system in the first place, deciding what issues will comprise 
the dispute. The parties also have complete control over settlement.32
The parties can also choose when to settle and how to structure the 
settlement. Courts, by contrast, can take only the cases brought be-
fore them.33 Therefore, the public nature of any dispute in the civil 
justice system is a mere by-product or, as Arthur Miller puts it, “col-
                                                                                                                    
 28. See Miller, supra note 7 (arguing against the public law reform movement to per-
mit complete public access to all court information); Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8 (ar-
guing that disputants own the dispute and should be able to control settlement processes 
because the litigation process is designed to put the disputants’ interests first, not the pub-
lic’s); Drahozal & Hines, supra note 9 (arguing that regulation of secret settlements may be 
ineffective and counter-productive). 
 29. Miller notes that by regulating confidentiality in the civil litigation process, one 
upsets the balance of the adversarial nature of the framework for resolving civil disputes 
because there is a direct symbiosis between procedural rules and the pursuit of substantive 
rights. See Miller, supra note 7, at 466. 
 30. See, e.g., Doré, supra note 1, at 286 (explaining the underlying value of party au-
tonomy in the civil litigation system). 
 31. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 2669 (arguing that the public view’s focus 
on litigation’s structural and institutional goals has ignored the role of the actual dispu-
tants who are involved in the litigation). 
 32. See id. at 2696 (stating that the litigation process is a “party-initiated and party-
controlled legal system”). 
 33. See, e.g., Avedis H. Sefarian & James T. Wakley, Secrecy Clauses in Sexual Mole-
station Settlements: Should Courts Agree to Seal Documents in Cases Involving the Catho-
lic Church?, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 801, 807 (2003). 
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lateral”34 to the actual private dispute between the parties. Parties 
often do not even require interaction with the public justice system to 
solve their disputes. Instead, they bargain within the “shadow of the 
law,” knowing that certain legal rules will apply if the case proceeds 
to trial.35 The shift of the civil justice system from one of trial as the 
main event to pretrial procedures as the main event has led to a de-
creasing role for final adjudication on the merits in civil litigation.36
In fact, most cases settle.37 The strong arm of the law is not necessar-
ily applied within the courtroom. With so little “public” in the public 
dispute resolution system, the public view of civil litigation seems to 
forget that much of what is driving the system are disputes about 
private law issues. 
 In fact, the public view may well be an uncomfortable fit with the 
down-and-dirty world of real-life litigation. The majority of disputes 
in the civil litigation system are not broad-reaching societal water-
marks exploring important public rights but are instead disputes in-
volving injury or simple contract breach.38 The public view of civil lit-
igation thus appears to be more suitable for a society in which every 
second civil case is about school segregation or civil rights instead of 
fender-benders and fence disputes between neighbors.  
 The private view’s difficulty with the public view conception of civ-
il settlements stems largely from the fact that civil disputes live, 
breathe, and die by the parties themselves.39 In the eyes of the par-
ties, private civil litigation is not conducted for the benefit of the pub-
                                                                                                                    
 34. See Miller, supra note 7, at 431 (“[P]ublic access to information produced in litiga-
tion has always been a secondary benefit” or side effect to the real purpose of the litigation: 
dispute resolution between private parties); see also Richard L. Marcus, The Discovery 
Confidentiality Controversy, 1991 U. ILL. L. REV. 457 (1991) (arguing that the collateral in-
formational disclosure in civil litigation should not eclipse the main purpose of litigation–to 
solve private disputes). 
 35. See Galanter & Cahill, supra note 1, at 1341 (concluding that most cases settle 
without judicial intervention but “in the shadow of the law,” using the rule of law as pre-
dictor for outcomes); see also Doré, supra note 1, at 384 (indicating that many cases settle 
without any court involvement whatsoever). 
 36. The reduced importance of the trial in the civil litigation process is marked by the 
reference to the civil trial as presently nothing more than a failed settlement in the justice 
system. Samuel R. Gross & Kent D. Syverud, Getting to No: A Study of Settlement Negotia-
tions and the Selection of Cases for Trial, 90 MICH. L. REV. 319, 320 (1991). 
 37. Ninety-five percent of civil litigation cases end in settlement, though that rate may 
vary slightly depending on the type of case. While there is some divergence of opinion as to 
the precise settlement rate, it is certain that the majority of cases in the civil litigation sys-
tem settle before trial. See, e.g., Marc Galanter & Mia Cahill, “Most Cases Settle”: Judicial 
Promotion and Regulation of Settlements, 46 STAN. L. REV. 1339, 1339-40 (1994); Frank E.A. 
Sander, The Obsession with Settlement Rates, 11 NEGOTIATION J. 329, 331 (1995). 
 38. See Miller, supra note 7, at 467. 
 39. See id. at 431-32 (arguing that forcing full disclosure of all litigation information 
goes against the civil justice system’s ideals of improved efficiency and settlement promo-
tion in the hopes of reducing cost and delay in dispute resolution). 
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lic.40 Private litigants pay the costs and are saddled with the risks of 
litigation. Therefore, private litigants should be free to bargain with 
whatever tools are available, including their rights to disclose mat-
ters about their own case. Ask any litigant in the middle of a lawsuit 
why he or she sued in the first place. The answer will undoubtedly be 
something along the lines of “I was hurt.” The public view of civil liti-
gation and secret settlements thus appears to be far removed from 
the individual litigants who are the actors in the litigation system 
and who control it by their own decisions.41
C.   Why “Public” and “Private”? 
 David Luban refers to these competing visions of the civil justice 
system as the “problem-solving view” and the “public-life conception” 
of litigation.42 This Article chooses instead to refer to the two differ-
ent perspectives as the public and private views of the civil litigation 
system, along similar lines to Leandra Lederman who, in examining 
the value of precedent as an integral part of litigation outcomes, po-
sits that balancing settlement and precedent concerns necessarily re-
quires a balancing of both public and private aspects of litigation.43
There are three reasons for using Lederman’s “public” and “private” 
terminology when examining secret settlements. Each reason under-
lines the fact that these two views may not be mutually exclusive (as 
has traditionally been presented in most scholarly thinking to date) 
but instead operate on a graduated continuum which may shift, de-
pending upon the type of case and the type of procedural solution 
best suited to the problem. 
 First, there is already a traditional analytic division among scho-
lars between private law and public law norms and modalities of 
thinking. Private law encompasses individual rights at stake 
amongst individuals–property, tort, and contract. Even if an individ-
ual litigant is a government entity, that entity exercises options and 
control in the litigation process as would a cognoscente living party. 
When to settle, how to settle, and if to settle at all become the deci-
sions of the party itself. The idea of party control and party autonomy 
is thus synonymous with the idea of private actors exercising private 
rights in a private law context (e.g., A harms B, B sues A under a 
negligence theory to seek redress from A).  
 A public law standpoint, however, places greater emphasis on the 
state-as-party concept, where the state is representative stakeholder 
                                                                                                                    
 40. Although that certainly may not be true in the eyes of the public, which funds the 
court system as a public dispute resolution system. 
 41. Menkel-Meadow dubs the public view’s tendency to minimize the role of individual 
disputants a kind of “litigation romanticism.” See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 2669. 
 42. See Luban, supra note 4, at 2632-33.  
 43. See Lederman, supra note 3. 
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for the rights of a group of people. Collective interests subsume indi-
vidual rights. Public law involves a certain shared consciousness 
about shaping the political conversation and the polity. The values 
laden in public law topics are assumed to be collective values–
fundamental freedoms and rights, and state punishment for wrong-
doing in society. Therefore, constitutional law and criminal law often 
must balance the rights of the individual with the rights of society as 
a whole. Thus, using the terms “public view” and “private view” as 
descriptors for how one views the civil litigation system are designed 
to hearken to the traditional academic division between public and 
private law norms and doctrine. 
 Second, the terms “public view” and “private view” are perhaps 
more appropriate than Luban’s “problem-solving” and “public-life 
conception” labels because many litigants in the civil justice system 
are concerned with solving problems, even though the rights at issue 
are decidedly “public-life” rights. In essence, all litigation is an at-
tempt to solve problems. Litigation about school desegregation had a 
decidedly “public-life” element in operation and effect, but no one 
would argue against the fact that its ultimate purpose was also to 
solve a problem. Luban’s labels have thus stated normative goals 
that are not mutually exclusive. Private cases can solve public prob-
lems and contribute to the common public good, and public cases can 
be remarkably private and singular in effect. Labels such as “public” 
and “private” that use descriptors that are not normative results but 
rather modalities of viewing the legal landscape might, therefore, be 
more helpful when one is designing the conversation about if and in 
what context the civil litigation system needs redirection. 
 Finally, using the terms “public” and “private” jettisons the value-
laden prescriptive baggage that may be inherent in Luban’s terms. 
Labeling one way of thinking about the justice system as “problem-
solving” and another as the “public-life conception” requires one to 
take a side with certain values and approach litigation system design 
issues with those values at hand. The danger is an ideologically ex-
clusive approach that perhaps clouds judgment along the way. There 
is no room for the private in the public view conception of civil litiga-
tion. The most sensible solutions to problems may not always line up 
exclusively with “public-life” benefits. Alternatively, the solutions 
may not be completely internally consistent with the individualistic 
nature of Luban’s “problem-solving” label. Using the terms public 
and private instead as descriptors for charting the debate does not 
require participants to initially value solutions based on perceived 
outcomes. Instead, it allows for viewing these perspectives along a 
graduated continuum. While one procedural solution may fit best 
with a decidedly private view, another (such as a procedural solution 
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for mass harms in an aggregate litigation context) may require a 
more blended public-private approach.  
III.   PUBLIC VIEW CRITICISMS OF SECRET SETTLEMENTS
 There is an interesting dyadic relationship between secret settle-
ment criticisms or benefits and one’s view of litigation. Criticisms of 
secret settlements emanate largely from those who adopt a public 
view of civil litigation. Those who adopt a private view of civil litiga-
tion tend to be more accepting of secret settlements. What is consi-
dered a criticism from one viewpoint is often a benefit seen by the 
other. That is why an examination of this particular aspect of the civ-
il justice system holds potential to reveal elements of the larger theo-
retical dynamic behind charting the design of the system.  
A.   Secret Settlements Defy Systemic Transparency 
 The public view of civil litigation holds that secret settlements de-
fy systemic transparency. Curiously, however, the civil justice system 
already operates within layers of transparency. Furthermore, trans-
parency as publicity comes at a cost to some key values engendered 
by the public view.44 The private view of civil litigation actually en-
sures more than enough protection for reasonable levels of public 
view-inspired disclosure. 
 One of the main tenets of the public view of civil litigation is that 
it is a decidedly public process. The state funds the court system. The 
public participates in a transparent conversation about legal rights. 
To that end, citizens have some ownership, at least in spirit, of what 
happens within that system. Secret settlements are therefore ana-
thema in a system that is, at heart, for the public good because the 
bedrock of the system is transparency of information.45 The whole 
reason for a public dispute resolution system is that it operates for 
the benefit of the public. Therefore, participants in the system must 
submit to such publicity. Making secret the outcome of a settled dis-
pute that began in such a system removes the public’s ability to learn 
from the dispute. The parties have, therefore, for their sole selfish 
benefit, compromised the values that make a public system public.  
                                                                                                                    
 44. This notion about questioning transparency as an absolute value in civil litigation 
tracks Mark Fenster’s broader criticism of transparency theory’s “abstract normative 
commitments and consequentialist assumptions . . . .” Mark Fenster, The Opacity of 
Transparency, 91 IOWA L. REV. 885, 933 (2006). 
 45. See, e.g., Anne-Thérèse Béchamps, Sealed Out-of-Court Settlements: When Does 
the Public Have a Right to Know?, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 117, 156 (1990) (calling for an 
open judicial system not trumped by private party interests). 
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 However, the mere act of filing a claim with a public court gene-
rates instant public access to an incredible array of information.46
The claim itself lays out the dispute, particulars of material facts, 
identities of parties, theories of liability, and some notion of remedies 
and value of the claims. This is all available to the public. Even if a 
case settles with a confidentiality requirement as part of the settle-
ment, the claim is still accessible in the public court file. If publicity 
and transparency are so important to the public view of civil litiga-
tion, why then is it that there are not more individuals peeking into 
civil court files? 47
 The civil litigation system already operates with a great deal of 
secrecy in order to foster party-driven dispute resolution.48 There is 
very little in a civil litigation case that is completely open to the pub-
lic. In fact, secrecy is purposely built into the litigation system in a 
variety of ways. Discovery is a private, confidential fact-finding 
process. The concepts of lawyer-client privilege and litigation privi-
lege are designed to keep certain classes of information out of the 
public realm so that parties can be at liberty to construct their dis-
puting strategies in an adversarial fashion. Settlement negotiations 
are also deemed privileged, precisely for the purpose of fostering the 
settlement of disputes. Alternative dispute resolution processes such 
as mediation are nearly always, by consent, a confidential process. 
Pretrial settlement conferences in front of a judge are confidential in 
order to prompt settlement. Jury deliberations are also secret.  
 With the main facts of a dispute made public by the filing of a 
claim, and with much of the disputing process shrouded in secrecy by 
design, it is puzzling how the loss to the public of mere settlement in-
formation can harm the public good. Often the only information not 
disclosed to the public as a result of a secret settlement is the mone-
tary amount of the settlement.49 Rarer still is the secrecy about the 
fault of the parties or perhaps specific detailed facts about the dis-
pute. Transparency is not an absolute for resolution of disputes uti-
lizing the public justice system. Further, since the vast majority of 
cases settle, secret settlements are likely not denying the public any-
                                                                                                                    
 46. See Miller, supra note 7, at 502; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 2695 (asserting that 
parties seeking settlement approval by a court necessarily waive the secrecy of the settlement). 
 47. Indeed, Ben Depoorter surveys the present potential feedback effect of settlement 
information as it is disseminated through various sources (i.e. the media and lawyers). See
Ben Depoorter, Law in the Shadow of Bargaining: The Feedback Effect of Civil Settlements,
95 CORNELL L. REV. 101 (2010). 
 48. See Miller, supra note 7, at 429. 
 49. For example, many in the media use language such as “the parties settled for an 
undisclosed amount” when reporting on the details of a settlement. See, e.g., Lisa Sink, 
Sexual Assault Lawsuit Settled for Undisclosed Amount, MILWAUKEE JOURNAL SENTINEL,
Mar. 5, 1997, at 2, available at http://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1683&dat= 
19970325&id=RHUaAAAAIBAJ&sjid=Fy4EAAAAIBAJ&pg=5604,1538704. 
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thing anyway. Public adjudication is the exception, not the norm. 
There is currently no mechanism demanding public publishing of set-
tlement agreements. Settlement agreements are not usually entered 
into court.50 This begs the question: what is it that secret settlements 
are hiding that would not already be hidden in a public trial?  
 In fact, by not allowing confidentiality in the final settlement 
agreement, this forced transparency may actually increase public 
harm because no party will discuss the details of the dispute other 
than in the context of a trial.51 A ban on secrecy may incentivize in-
formation suppression during settlement negotiations.52 Without the 
shield of secrecy, research results, safety issues, and crucial liability 
facts may not be revealed at all. Secrecy has the inverse property of 
prompting disclosure between the litigants who can rely on the facts 
not being made public. Secrecy is not always harmful. Thus, transpa-
rency of the public system is not compromised with secret settle-
ments.53 It may even be indirectly enhanced because at least “some-
one” (i.e., the parties) will have access to some information. It follows 
that publicity of information reduces the value of confidentiality to 
the parties, making it worthless in settlement negotiations.54
 Maintaining secret settlements (a decidedly private view notion) 
thus inversely assists in achieving the public view value of at least 
some transparency. The same cannot be said of strict adherence to 
the public view’s notion of full transparency in settlements. Litigants 
lose some bargaining power, and the public may be deprived of more 
open litigation communication as the end result. The private view of 
civil litigation, therefore, leads to a more blended solution in effect. 
Perhaps, then, the private view of civil litigation is not a competing 
normative view incapable of reconciliation with the public view but is 
instead more flexible, interdependent, and dynamic in nature. 
                                                                                                                    
 50. Although they can be, such as to enforce a future settlement in a court order. 
 51. See Emily Fiftal, Respecting Litigants’ Privacy and Public Needs: Striking Middle 
Ground in an Approach to Secret Settlements, 54 CASE W. RES. L. REV. 503, 528 (2003).  
 52. Or, as Miller argues, removing confidentiality in the litigation process will bur-
den, rather than facilitate, litigants’ use of the system. See Miller, supra note 7, at 432; see 
also Drahozal & Hines, supra note 9, at 1458 (claiming that restrictions on secret settle-
ments may restrict information about health and safety hazards that would otherwise be 
made available to the public). 
 53. James M. Anderson surmises that civil justice concepts of transparency and pub-
licity are actually a transaction tax that creates a deadweight cost in derailing settlement 
agreements that the plaintiff and defendant would otherwise accept if confidentiality were 
allowed. See James M. Anderson, Understanding Mass Tort Defendant Incentives for Con-
fidential Settlements: Lessons from Bayer’s Cerivastatin Litigation Strategy, at 12 (RAND 
Inst. for Civil Justice, Working Paper No. WR-617-ICJ, 2008). 
 54. Id. at 23. 
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B.   Secret Settlements Do Not Contribute to the Public Good 
 According to the public view of secret settlements, settling a dispute 
in a confidential fashion does not contribute to the public good.55 The 
public is not equipped with the tools necessary to evaluate the particu-
lar dispute’s resultant place in the firmament of legal proceedings, or 
so the thinking goes. Without information about a settlement in a pub-
lic proceeding, courts, lawyers and future litigants are deprived of the 
facts and the predictive value of the settled case.56 Thus, no one knows 
how factually similar cases may be resolved at trial. Scholars who es-
pouse the public view of civil litigation often decry settlement itself for 
removing valuable legal precedents from the public commons.57 Mak-
ing settlement information unavailable to the public is doubly stinging 
because the dispute will not progress to adjudication, while the public 
is also denied the informational value contained in the facts of the set-
tlement. Yet, the private view’s determination to maintain secret set-
tlements does not completely eclipse public view concerns. In fact, 
maintaining secret settlements preserves some important public view 
cost concerns, which is completely aligned with the public view’s nor-
mative goals about the public good. 
 According to the public view, secret settlements also deny future 
litigants information about the dispute.58 Supporters of the public 
view of civil litigation point to the inefficiency of allowing disputants 
to keep confidential information that might otherwise assist future 
parties. If a plaintiff in a products liability lawsuit, for example, signs 
a confidential settlement agreement with a particular defendant 
manufacturer, the information gleaned in that lawsuit will not be 
available for other plaintiffs who may want to pursue similar law-
suits against that same manufacturer. This could result in inefficien-
cies in administrative and information costs, as future litigants will 
have to go to the expense and trouble of essentially relitigating dis-
putes that have already been resolved.  
                                                                                                                    
 55. See, e.g., Luban, supra note 4, at 2653 (asserting that other litigants have an in-
terest in information created through the litigation process); Jules Coleman & Charles Sil-
ver, Justice in Settlements, 4 SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y 102, 114-19 (1986) (judicial precedent as a 
public good). 
 56. See Luban, supra note 4, at 2639 (noting that settlement information has some 
precedential value for lawyers who are repeat players in the litigation system). 
 57. See, e.g., id. at 2622; Fiss, supra note 5, at 1085; Lederman, supra note 3, at 256, 
268 (arguing that the public need for precedent must be balanced by the private need for 
settlement); but see Menkel Meadow, supra note 8, at 2682 (arguing that overburdened 
and prolific courts surely must be producing an optimal amount of precedent for suitable 
public discourse). 
 58. See Luban, supra note 4, at 2653 (arguing that facts in a lawsuit are public goods 
that are purchased by one litigant and should be made available to the public). 
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 The private view’s answer to the public good criticism of secret set-
tlements is simple: it is not the public’s dispute.59 If the normative goal 
of the civil justice system is to contribute to the public good, achieving 
that goal necessarily requires a kind of “tax” be borne by the litigants 
themselves for the good of the public. Public disputes are resolved 
within the confines of the adversarial system, and party autonomy is 
key.60 Parties themselves make all decisions about the subject matter 
of the dispute and whether to settle. The parties in the dispute pay the 
costs of litigation. The public purse provides the administrative 
framework for the dispute resolution process: the judge, the rules of 
civil procedure, and the courthouse forum. However, that is the extent 
of the public’s contribution to the dispute. The parties also bear the 
risk of losing and having to pay a portion of the successful litigant’s le-
gal costs as well. This risk is not borne by the public. It is a rosy pic-
ture of the litigation world indeed if one believes that litigants expend 
resources, time, and emotional energy in a lawsuit with the sole lofty 
goal of somehow contributing to the public commons.61 While such a 
goal may certainly be collateral to one’s use of the public justice sys-
tem, it is dangerous if it supplants the private view’s goal of solving 
individual disputes as the primary modality for the system. 
 Even viewing the system as a whole, it is difficult to understand 
why settlement tools like the option to bargain for secrecy should be 
removed so that the public can benefit from the settlement informa-
tion. Those who endorse this public view have perhaps not spent 
enough time watching a litigant,62 who, in pursuit of her case, spends 
her life’s savings on legal fees, risks her house by facing adverse legal 
fees awards, has her most private secrets relived in discovery, and 
lives with the entire process for nearly a decade as it chugs through 
the system. If not for her case, the system would not have her infor-
mation to disclose. Should she have to surrender the right to control 
access to that information in exchange for access to the marginally 
tangential public administrative aspects of the system? Is the appro-
priate “tax” she must pay for using the public system really the re-
moval of what might be a valued settlement tool? 
 Forced public settlement disclosure may also actually encourage 
litigation. Surely this cannot be in the common public good. If infor-
                                                                                                                    
 59. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 7, at 431; Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 2692. 
 60. See Doré, supra note 1, at 297-98 (asserting that party autonomy exists even in 
public cases in the civil justice system, as the parties themselves bear the risks and costs of 
the litigation). 
 61. Although many litigants may have as a residual reason for starting a civil ac-
tion—to prevent others from experiencing the harm they had experienced—the focus of 
this altruistic motivation is still on the individual harm the initial litigant faced. The indi-
vidual had to first suffer in order to gain the motivation, or reason, to sue. The lawsuit is 
about the individual, and the individual is in control. 
 62. Or a lawyer acting on a contingent fee on her client’s behalf. 
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mation about a typical lawsuit is disclosed to the public, there is a 
real possibility that lawsuits that would not have otherwise been 
brought will suddenly appear. While the public view considers this  
an efficiency in cost savings for future litigants, the private view 
takes a more longitudinal approach to this information disclosure. As 
more potential litigants are made aware of a pending lawsuit, the li-
kelihood that additional future cases will be brought is similarly in-
creased. The fact remains that settling cases, secret or not, clears up 
the court’s docket so that it can take the necessary time when a more 
“public” dispute enters the system.63 Free informational discovery 
removes the barrier to entry for litigants. It also institutionalizes an 
obvious free-rider problem as the initial litigant must bear the costs 
to sue, but each subsequent litigant benefits from the first’s outlays.64
If one takes the civil litigation system’s fact-finding adversarial 
process as designed to foster truth-seeking, forced public settlement 
disclosure becomes a dangerous shortcut. When disclosed, what is 
properly relevant information in one lawsuit may do no more than 
encourage other litigants to take a shot at a similar lawsuit, whether 
meritorious or not. The upfront investment required for fact-finding 
in civil disputes can and does act as a clearinghouse for frivolous cas-
es. Removing that feature may, in effect, overburden the system. 
Wrong-headed or opportunistic lawsuits surely do not contribute to 
the public good, nor does an overwhelmed public litigation system. It 
is far more efficient to leave the proprietary nature of the dispute in 
the hands of the parties who started it, including the choice to keep 
the settlement secret.65
 The public view’s notion of contribution to the caselaw commons 
as a necessary product of litigating in the public system creates a 
                                                                                                                    
 63. Menkel-Meadow notes that if courts are so overburdened, there may already be an 
optimal amount of legal precedent available to achieve the level of public discourse that 
Luban and others desire. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 2682. 
 64. Jillian Smith argues that settlement disclosure increases lawsuit efficiency so 
that similarly injured individuals can share in the informational spoils of the first litigant 
to sue. See Jillian Smith, Secret Settlements: What You Don’t Know Can Kill You!, 2004 
MICH. ST. L. REV. 237, 255 (2004). 
 65. Interestingly, Luban appears to sidestep the value-creation quality of secret set-
tlements, where he acknowledges that banning secret settlements may eliminate the abili-
ty of “weak plaintiff[s]” to bargain toward settlement. Luban, supra note 3, at 2657. Luban 
does not counter this fact but instead notes that if secret settlements were banned, defen-
dants would still have the same incentives to settle. See id. at 2657-58. This rationalization 
falls short because removing secrecy from the bargaining process removes a compelling 
reason to settle in the usual course of litigation. Defendants may, in fact, have less incen-
tive to settle, as they may be just as well-off in a public courtroom if the settlement infor-
mation is to be made public in any event. The problem with Luban’s logic is that the “weak 
plaintiff” is just the type of litigant who cannot afford to run the risk of trial. Id. Menkel-
Meadow additionally counters Luban’s reasoning for ignoring the fact that plaintiffs, and 
not just defendants, want to keep secrecy as a settlement option for privacy concerns. See
Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 2684. 
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burdensome tax on users of the system. First, it assumes that cases 
are better off in the system than out. Yet the civil justice system is 
designed to foster settlement in many ways, such as pretrial motions 
to remove unmeritorious cases, threats of adverse legal fees, and 
judicial case conferences. It is, in effect, a system with a singular 
purpose: to get users out of the system. For the public view’s notion 
to operate properly, cases must stay in the system. That has serious 
public resource consequences. In contrast, the private view of litiga-
tion is completely compatible with the current system’s process of 
funneling cases toward settlement. In addition, the removal of secret 
settlements as an option for litigants may actually increase un-
wanted litigation, which is the opposite effect the public view expects. 
While the public view acknowledges that transparency will assist 
other litigants in bringing their cases forward with lower transaction 
costs, it does nothing to assess whether that is a desirable outcome. 
And the public view offers nothing to assist in determining which
cases are meritorious enough to benefit from the wholesale litigation 
clearinghouse that an absence of secrecy would bring. In litigation, 
quantity certainly cannot ever supplant quality as a sensible option. 
The private view of litigation is perhaps better equipped to balance 
this particular dynamic than its public counterpart. 
C.   Secret Settlements Perpetuate Danger 
 Some public view scholars and commentators argue that secret 
settlements can kill.66 This is powerful rhetoric, but it makes little 
sense when the arguments are deconstructed, particularly in light of 
private view concerns about the importance of secrecy in the settle-
ment dynamic as it pertains to safety information. In fact, what 
sounds like the most compelling reason to ban secret settlements– 
public safety–may actually end up making the public less safe by in-
centivizing selective reporting rather than the reporting of useful 
                                                                                                                    
 66. See, e.g., Fiftal, supra note 51, at 508; Luban, supra note 4, at 2653 (arguing that 
litigation information can save lives and inform public deliberation about matters of politi-
cal significance). See also David S. Sanson, The Pervasive Problem of Court-Sanctioned Se-
crecy and the Exigency of National Reform, 53 DUKE L.J. 807, 827 (2003) (arguing for legis-
lative reform that would mandate court disclosure of information deemed a threat to public 
safety); Amie Sloane, Secret Settlements and Protecting Public Health and Safety: How Can 
We Disclose With Our Mouths Shut?, 3 APPALACHIAN J.L. 61, 68-70 (2004) (contending that 
environmental legislation should prompt disclosure of health and safety information in set-
tlements); Smith, supra note 64, at 268 (arguing for uniform federal legislation requiring 
disclosure of settlements that affect public health or safety); Richard A. Zitrin, The Case 
Against Secret Settlements (Or, What You Don’t Know Can Hurt You), 2 J. INST. FOR STUDY
LEGAL ETHICS 115, 122-23 (1999) (proposing code of conduct changes to preclude lawyers 
from entering into confidential agreements that keep secret matters of public health or 
safety). It is quite a bold assertion to argue that confidentiality clauses in settlements “cost 
lives.” There are simply too many dependent precursor variables and actions required for 
the publication of settlement information to even have any noticeable impact on safety. 
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safety information. Finally, the public view’s distaste for secret set-
tlements may actually be driven by a deeper, hidden preference to 
use civil settlements as state-like regulatory or quasi-criminal pu-
nishment mechanisms–a strong public law notion. 
 According to the public view, secret settlements allow information 
pertaining to safety to remain undisclosed.67 Such information could 
include things like product failures or the identity of potential crimi-
nals. Without such information made public, the danger remains a se-
cret and people could again be hurt. By endorsing secret settlements, 
the litigation system misses the opportunity to warn those at risk and 
punish wrongdoers. Plaintiffs often place great value on the assistance 
their cases will provide to others, be it future litigants or those whose 
safety might be similarly affected. Secret settlements hinder this al-
truistic motivation. Safety concerns hold within them a powerful rhe-
toric—who would not want to see society more safe? Hidden dangers 
lurking within manufactured products need to be brought to the con-
suming public’s attention. Toxic torts bubbling near someone’s home 
need to be revealed. The identities of sexual perpetrators need to be 
exposed to keep a community safe, so the logic goes.68
 This argument against secret settlements has a number of as-
sumptions that do not hold together. First, settlement is not adjudi-
cation. A defendant, be it a manufacturer, an alleged polluter, or an 
alleged sexual perpetrator, may settle for a variety of reasons other 
than admitted fault. Cost, risk, valuation of time, or a desire to end 
the matter could be prime motivators for settlement. A settlement 
does not mean the party has been found to be negligent under the 
rule of law; it means the parties compromised. A settlement also does 
not mean a plaintiff is free of issues affecting her case, such as con-
tributory negligence, lack of evidence, credibility issues, or blackmail-
style motivations. Settlement does not mean that the manufacturer 
is negligent, that the polluter is poisoning the environment, or that 
the alleged perpetrator is guilty or dangerous. In the most extreme 
example, settlement could be no more than an agreement to dismiss 
the lawsuit without the risk of the defendant pursuing legal costs. 
That surely does nothing to establish fault or  lack thereof on any-
one’s part. Such information is simply not publicly available to assist 
in making any fault or danger assessments.  
                                                                                                                    
 67. Fiftal surmises that the very information most likely to be helpful to the public– 
safety is the information that is also most likely to be held secret by the wealthiest corpo-
rations. Fiftal, supra note 51, at 508-09. What Fiftal’s analysis misses is that there is no 
empirical evidence that, even if available to the public, such settlement information would 
or even could do anything to promote safety and deter public hazards, except perhaps in 
the rarest of cases. 
 68. See id. at 554-56. 
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 Therefore, it is wrong to assume that settlement equals a finding 
of fault.69 This dangerous logical leap may actually be a strong reason 
to have secret settlements in a litigation system. The public cannot 
reliably evaluate what settlement information means. The public can 
only evaluate based on inaccurate assumptions, prime among them 
that settlement equals fault. 
 Second, the public view of safety as paramount vastly overestimates 
the value of safety-related information that could be gleaned from a 
settlement document. Only the rarest of cases would truly have hidden 
information that could not already be found from the claim alone, 
which is already a public document.70 What possible information could 
be hidden from society in a settlement agreement?71 The public view 
proponents would argue that party identities would be important to 
know, as well as the existence of unsafe products. But what would the 
world do with such information? Put an alleged perpetrator on a list of 
sex offenders merely because he settled a claim? As demonstrated 
above, settlement is not adjudication—it is compromise. 
 There is also no evidence that a public settlement does anything to 
increase safety in a generalized fashion.72 This becomes evident when 
one traces the steps necessary to make some hypothetically relevant 
information public, in order that someone can act to augment safety. 
Imagine a settlement where a manufacturer settles a claim for a defec-
tive product. How does the public gain access to that information if the 
settlement is not secret? First, someone must discover that the lawsuit 
was even filed, which requires a search of the public records. Second, 
once the claim is found, someone (presumably the media) must read it 
                                                                                                                    
 69. See, e.g., Weinstein, supra note 17, at 61 (noting the possibility of the public mi-
sunderstanding settlement information, such as settlement amounts). 
 70. Laleh Ispahani argues that lawyers should have an “affirmative ethical duty” to 
refuse to enter into confidential settlement agreements if there is information which might 
“prevent adverse health and safety consequences for the public.” Laleh Ispahani, Note, The 
Soul of Discretion: The Use and Abuse of Confidential Settlements, 6 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS
111, 112 (1992). However, as noted above, it is difficult to determine what, if any, informa-
tion would lead to such prevention of harm. Usually, prevention is contingent on an array 
of regulatory and reporting steps occurring outside the confines of the settlement. This 
makes putting the ethical burden on the lawyer somewhat problematic and conflicting in 
that, for this particular decision, the lawyer’s client shifts from the individual to the public 
as a whole. Id. See also Zitrin, supra note 66, at 122-23 (proposing code of conduct changes 
to preclude lawyers from entering into confidential agreements that keep secret matters of 
public health or safety). 
 71. Arthur Miller notes that the “vast majority of litigation” has very little “public inter-
est” to it. Miller, supra note 7, at 467 (internal quotation marks omitted). Ben Depoorter also 
notes the ambiguous effect that forced settlement would have on litigation, stating that in-
formation about settlements is already widely available in a variety of fora, and usually si-
multaneously with the settlement information. See Depoorter, supra note 47, at 127-128. 
 72. See Miller, supra note 7, at 482. Luban argues that when litigants settle, they 
pass the costs of secrecy on to an innocent third party not present at the bargaining table. 
Luban, supra note 4, at 2653. This, however, assumes that this information has value to 
the third party.  
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and understand it. Third, the settlement agreement must somehow al-
so be in the court file. Currently, that is not a standard step in every 
case, unless the parties attach a copy of the agreement to the re-
quested court order dismissing the action, or unless the parties request 
that the judge make the settlement terms a part of the order dismiss-
ing the action. Even assuming that there is somehow a settlement 
agreement in the public file, what can one do with that information in 
the name of safety? Report it, the argument goes, so that other mem-
bers of the public may benefit from the information.  
 There is a real risk that the reporting of such a selective amount 
of information could do more harm than good. Imagine if a settlement 
is reported between a pharmaceutical manufacturer and a patient. 
The reporting of the settlement accomplishes nothing more than to 
spur on other litigants to try their hand at a lawsuit if they have 
been taking that drug. Certainly, some claims may be meritorious. 
Others, perhaps not. Perhaps proponents hope that some government 
watchdog agency will investigate the pharmaceutical company. It is 
unclear, however, just how that might come about. In fact, such a 
press release could be part of the terms of the negotiated settlement, 
even though the identity, fault, and amount of the settlement remain 
secret. Now imagine if a settlement is reported between a church mi-
nister and an alleged abuse victim. The reporting of that information, 
without the full facts available, can certainly do  reputational harm 
to both the minister and the victim. Is this the proper balance society 
should seek to achieve, all in the name of safety—publication on set-
tlement information alone? It could be argued that such disclosure 
tramples over privacy rights in the name of perceived public safety. 
 Not all settlements contain information that benefits the public.73
Of the thousands of civil lawsuits filed each year, the large majority 
will be for personal injury or contractual disputes. Therefore, it is of-
ten difficult to understand how the removal of the secret settlement 
tool in the name of safety will benefit society if the bulk of informa-
tion floating about the court system in settlements is, for all practical 
purposes, useless when it comes to safety. Furthermore, it is difficult 
and costly to separate those few cases that might actually have pub-
licly beneficial information from those displaying information that 
amounts to no more than titillating, newsy gossip.74 In fact, just 
                                                                                                                    
 73. See Miller, supra note 7, at 467 (noting that the vast majority of civil litigation in-
volves complex and technical details with fact situations unhelpful to daily life); see also
Andrew D. Goldstein, Sealing and Revealing: Rethinking the Rules Governing Public 
Access to Information Generated Through Litigation, 81 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 375, 405-06 
(2006) (noting that the public’s interest in discovery materials is qualitatively different 
than the use the public could make of information in settlement agreements). 
 74. See Miller, supra note 7, at 467 (arguing that courts would be overburdened if 
they had to distinguish between curiosity and voyeurism interests as opposed to legitimate 
public safety concerns). 
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about any case can be skewed to appear to have an aspect of health 
and safety to it, from an automobile accident in which the driver 
failed to wear a seatbelt to a wrongful dismissal case in which unsafe 
working conditions are alleged. The danger of violating real privacy 
interests, therefore, likely outweighs tangential, ephemeral, and dif-
ficult-to-define safety concerns.75
 A contextual approach to limiting secrecy for certain cases in the 
name of safety is also problematic.76 It is nearly impossible to define 
which cases should lose the right to bargain with secrecy. It is even 
more difficult to attempt to define why those particular cases should 
lose that right. Should all litigants involved in sexual assault cases 
be forbidden to bargain with secrecy? What if that is the only leve-
rage available to the plaintiff? Do all products liability settlements 
have beneficial information to the public, such that disclosure always 
outweighs the opportunity cost that is lost when secret settlements 
are banned? 
 Florida and Texas, for example, have enacted “sunshine” laws de-
signed to further public access to settlements, all in the name of safe-
ty. In Florida, a settlement cannot conceal a “public hazard.” 77 In 
Texas, all court documents must be made public if they contain in-
formation that might have an “adverse effect on the public.” 78 Other 
states, such as Arkansas79 and Washington,80 have enacted more nar-
rowly tailored responses to secret settlements. These legislative 
measures have been met with much controversy and criticism.81 Tell-
                                                                                                                    
 75. There would be, of course, a slightly different informational dynamic for a mass 
torts case where there is a significant number of people injured as a result of someone 
else’s action. In those instances, a more public-centered stance may be needed to balance 
out the various competing concerns. This Article, however, leaves the aggregate and mass 
litigation cases to be categorized on the continuum another day. 
 76. See, e.g.,  Fiftal, supra note 51, at 548, 554 (arguing that confidentiality should be 
the norm for settlements, with the exception of cases about national security, government 
entities, products liability, sexual violence, and substantial public health and safety 
threats); see also Béchamps, supra note 45, at 144 (proposing a statutory regime for sealing 
court decisions with exceptions militating against secrecy for a variety of lawsuits). 
 77. See FLA. STAT. § 69.081 (2009) (prohibiting a court order or settlement from con-
cealing a “public hazard”). 
 78. See TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a(1)(a)(2) (mandating that all court documents are public, in-
cluding settlement documents, if such contain information that might have an adverse ef-
fect upon the general public health or safety); see also Doggett & Mucchetti, supra note 26 
(arguing in favor of TEX. R. CIV. P. 76a, which makes public access to court records the 
standard rule). 
 79. ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-55-122 (2009) (permitting a court to void settlement provi-
sions that restrict a person’s right to disclose an environmental hazard). 
 80. WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 4.24.611(4)(b) (2009) (stating that confidential settle-
ments of products liability or hazardous substances are only allowed when a court finds 
such confidentiality to be in the public interest). 
 81. See, e.g., Miller, supra note 7, at 436; Laurie Kratky Doré, Public Courts Versus 
Private Justice: It’s Time to Let Some Sun Shine In On Alternative Dispute Resolution, 81 
CHI.-KENT L. REV. 463 (2006) (discussing the possibilities for transparency for disputes re-
solved through alternative dispute resolution other than litigation).
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ingly, there appears to be no caselaw to date interpreting what these 
provisions mean. What is a “public hazard?” Is it an environmental 
spill, a sexual perpetrator, a drunk driver, or any tortfeasor? And 
what information could have an “adverse effect on the public?” Could 
such cases include fraudulent stock trading or a slip and fall at a na-
tional grocery store chain? The statutory mechanisms offer no guid-
ance as to when and how these provisions are to be applied. Perhaps 
this is real evidence that the “public good” aspect of informational ex-
change, which is so important to the public view of secret settle-
ments, is actually not at all important in practical reality. The sta-
tutes may be no more than toothless appeasements to those who hold 
the public view of litigation and worry about any remote possibility of 
concealment of safety information.82 Even with a contextual, categor-
ical approach to secret settlement bans, parties can still negotiate 
around such restrictions.  
 Public view scholars often point to potential safety benefits when 
arguing in favor of such high levels of settlement disclosure. But, as 
the above examples demonstrate, settlement should never be a subs-
titute for punitive criminal sanctions.83 Relying on an inefficient and 
vague substitute for the criminal law without a full factual record is 
perhaps reckless in and of itself. The chances of inaccuracy and harm 
may be higher than the harm one is attempting to curb through dis-
closure. Private parties litigating typical private law bilateral dis-
putes are also not expected to be private attorneys general.84 As the 
system currently stands, the private civil lawsuit is not the vehicle 
for public punitive goals. For the most part, safety information for 
the public is a by-product of the private litigation system. That by-
product should not be elevated to an inappropriate and perhaps un-
safe level that compromises settlement dynamics respecting privacy. 
 What public view proponents are likely concerned about is settle-
ment generally. Secrecy is a secondary concern. Settlement takes the 
                                                                                                                    
 82. See, e.g., Fiftal, supra note 51, at 525-26 (indicating that courts rarely use  
sunshine laws). 
 83. In advocating for uniform federal legislation requiring the disclosure of settle-
ments touching on matters of public health and safety, Jillian Smith reasons that such leg-
islation would help hold wrongdoers accountable. See Smith, supra note 64, at 254-55. 
 84. As opposed to more decidedly public-centric types of cases, such as class actions 
and securities fraud, which by their very procedural design implicate plaintiffs in the role 
of quasi-private attorneys general. Dan Markel discusses the idea of having private attor-
neys general bring actions in the name of the public for cases involving punitive damages, 
in which such actions have some state regulation and the private actors become entitled to 
a “finder’s fee” in exchange for doing the investigative work of the state. See Dan Markel, 
Retributive Damages: A Theory of Punitive Damages as Intermediate Sanction, 94 CORNELL
L. REV. 239, 280 (2009); see also Dan Markel, How Should Punitive Damages Work?, 157 
U. PA. L. REV. 1383 (2009). Interestingly, his proposal is an insightful blend of the benefits 
of some select aspects of the public view of civil litigation with a frank acknowledgment of 
the value of the private view. Such a theoretical blending can prove equally insightful 
when viewing secret settlements in the context of the litigation system.  
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dispute out of the adjudicatory process and keeps informational control 
in the hands of the parties in the private sphere. Yet, as mentioned in 
the previous section, the civil litigation system already operates with a 
great deal of secrecy. No one is clamoring for the end of litigation privi-
lege in the name of safety. Menkel-Meadow notes that there is a dis-
tinct romanticism of civil litigation among some scholars.85 Perhaps 
this has led to a romanticism of settlement among public view propo-
nents. Regardless, the public view’s advocacy of safety concerns as a 
reason for rejecting the concept of secret settlements is turned upside-
down when one assesses the safety results through the private view’s 
lens in a litigation world without secret settlements. 
D.   Secret Settlements Take Advantage of the Vulnerable 
 The public view proponents also express perhaps misdirected con-
cerns that secret settlements take advantage of vulnerable litigants. 
This assumption leads to the conclusion that the private view of liti-
gation cannot–or will not–properly balance the needs of various par-
ties. In other words, the ability to freely contract out of litigation 
should be fettered by some state control in order to protect the vul-
nerable. The problem with the public view’s solution (a ban on secret 
settlements) is that it targets the freedom to contract, instead of the 
actual problem:  why are some litigants vulnerable? This is perhaps a 
not-so-subtle normative slip that underlines why the public view of 
civil litigation, in a vacuum, is often ideologically driven to somewhat 
illogical ends because it assumes the result must be incompatible 
with private view thinking. Instead, the private view of litigation fos-
ters a risk analysis approach that preserves freedom to contract 
while attempting to protect vulnerable interests. 
 According to the public view, the power and informational imbal-
ance inherent in much litigation tips in favor of the defendant. A lone 
plaintiff suing a corporation in a products liability lawsuit may be 
pressured to accept a settlement with a confidentiality clause be-
cause that plaintiff is out-resourced, out-lawyered, and out-
maneuvered. The plaintiff is not a repeat player in the litigation sys-
tem, whereas the defendant often is. This imbalance is all the more 
important if the plaintiff has been harmed in a particularly damag-
ing fashion, such as in physical, psychological or sexual abuse cases. 
Vulnerable people may not be in a position to evaluate their needs at 
the time of settlement. Confidentiality, which seemed to be a bar-
gaining chip at the time, may take on greater importance after the 
settlement is complete and the plaintiff regrets having lost the right 
to speak about the settlement. There is another concern that confus-
                                                                                                                    
 85. See Menkel-Meadow, supra note 8, at 2669. 
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ing confidentiality clauses have the potential, after particularly try-
ing disputes, to disrupt therapy and the healing process for plaintiffs. 
 The concerns here are very real, but the target of the angst may 
be misplaced. The target is the secret settlement. Perhaps the target 
should instead be lawyers who do not effectively advise their particu-
lar clients. Removing a value-creation bargaining tool from vulnera-
ble people may not be the most sensible way to protect those peoples’ 
long-term interests in the settlement process.86 In fact, it may cause 
more harm precisely because the plaintiff may not have that tool 
with which to bargain.87 Because vulnerable plaintiffs often face such 
informational and resource power imbalances, a trial is often a less 
palatable option.88 The toll of litigation on any person cannot be over-
estimated. The weight of such a process on one who is already in a 
precarious position can be debilitating. Settlement may be the only 
option. The plaintiff may not be able to finance or even survive a full 
trial. The evidentiary record may not be full enough for a trial. Set-
tlement, not adjudication, becomes the goal.  
 If that is the landscape that most of these vulnerable plaintiffs 
face, why remove a tool that may garner more compensation for the 
plaintiff and end the dispute more quickly, with less cost and less 
stress? The vulnerable plaintiff cannot usually use a trial as a credi-
ble threat, while the defendant can.89 The only real tool in the vul-
nerable plaintiff’s arsenal may be the threat of public exposure. Re-
moving the option of secret settlements for such litigants is akin to 
assuming that all plaintiffs cannot think for themselves and would 
not choose to bargain away secrecy for a price. This assumes the 
worst of the plaintiff–decisionary incapacity. It assumes that the 
                                                                                                                    
 86. Two studies revealed interesting results about the presence and absence of secre-
cy in a litigation context. Andrew F. Daughety and Jennifer F. Reinganum found that early 
claimants have negotiating leverage that allows them to get a higher settlement payout 
from a defendant in exchange for a secret settlement. However, later claimants fare worse 
in settlement scenarios in which secrecy is a factor. See Andrew F. Daughety & Jennifer F. 
Reinganum, Secrecy and Safety, 95 AM. ECON. REV. 1074 (2005); Andrew F. Daughety & 
Jennifer F. Reinganum, Hush Money, 30 RAND J. ECON. 661 (1999). Alison Lothes ex-
tended Daughety and Reinganum’s analysis to find that nonsecret settlements between de-
fendants and early claimants induced later claimants to bring more frivolous claims. 
Secrecy in the civil litigation system therefore may lead to a reduction in vexatious litiga-
tion by free-riding secondary litigants relying on public information from an initial lawsuit. 
See Alison Lothes, Quality, Not Quantity: An Analysis of Confidential Settlements and Li-
tigants’ Economic Incentives, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 433 (2005). 
 87. See, e.g., Fiftal, supra note 51, at 527 (arguing that secret settlements may be the 
only way a vulnerable plaintiff can get any compensation at all). 
 88. See id.
 89. Avedis H. Sefarian and James T. Wakley argue that settlement agreements in a 
litigation context usually operate in a pareto-optimal trade-off. See Sefarian & Wakley, su-
pra note 33, at 803. No party is worse off, and at least one party is better off after settle-
ment. Id. Secrecy may prompt settlement negotiations to get closer to pareto efficiency in a 
more expedient manner. 
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plaintiff will always be taken advantage of, when in fact it removes a 
potential advantage for those very plaintiffs.90
 One other possibility is to make it the plaintiff’s prerogative 
whether or not to settle with a confidentiality clause.91 At first blush, 
this appears to be empowering plaintiffs. If the plaintiff does not 
wish to submit to a confidentiality clause, a plaintiff does not have to 
do so. But this takes an overly simplistic view of how settlement ne-
gotiations are conducted. The negotiation landscape already makes 
settlement the plaintiff’s choice. Defendants in this sort of regime 
would know that the plaintiffs have the power to institute confiden-
tiality; so too would plaintiffs. The dynamic remains the same. Mere-
ly placing the ability to mention confidentiality as an option in the 
hands of the plaintiff will do nothing to curb settlement practices in-
volving secrecy. Both parties would be foolish not to explore in nego-
tiations whether secrecy has any value-added component for the set-
tlement. In fact, the plaintiff has the power to reject a secret settle-
ment at any time if confidentiality provisions are at all an issue. 
 It falls then on the shoulders of lawyers to protect their vulnerable 
clients’ needs. That is where the public view of civil litigation can be 
quite helpful, but only if tempered with the private view’s notion of 
the adversarial litigation process. The lawyer is the individual look-
ing out for the best interests of her client. If the client is likely to re-
quire therapy in the future, the lawyer should advise the client to not 
accept, or at the very least rework, a confidentiality clause to accom-
modate such future needs. If the client is unable to predict her future 
needs, the lawyer should be trained to provide that foresight for their 
client. Simply banning the option to bargain with secrecy takes away 
the ability of an informed but vulnerable plaintiff and her lawyer to 
bargain creatively with additional leverage.92
                                                                                                                    
 90. For example, in the Canadian case of Milne v. Pfizer, Inc., 2005 ABQB 236 (CanLII), 
the court approved a minor’s settlement and ordered the terms of the settlement confidential. 
The court determined it was in the minor’s best interests for the settlement to be approved, 
even with a confidentiality agreement, rather than to receive no settlement at all. 
 91. As was recommended by the Law Commission of Canada for cases involving gov-
ernment institutional abuse in RESTORING DIGNITY: RESPONDING TO CHILD ABUSE IN 
CANADIAN INSTITUTIONS 410 (2000). The Report recommends that government defendants 
should not impose confidentiality provisions on settlements with survivors of institutional 
abuse; rather, the choice should remain with the plaintiff. Curiously, there was no discus-
sion about the loss of value-creation to these same vulnerable plaintiffs if secret settle-
ments were removed from the settlement dynamic. 
 92. Minna J. Kotkin, while arguing against secret settlements for employment dis-
crimination cases and simultaneously decrying many aspects of the private view of civil lit-
igation, notes that there can be a sort of selective secrecy that may balance both perspec-
tives. See Kotkin, supra note 3, at 977. Kotkin suggests that a court could make available 
public data about the nature and extent of a settlement but keep the parties’ identities a 
secret, purely to assist in aggregating information about settlement rates. Id. The value of 
such information could assist in making the public aware of the prevalence of such claims 
in the workplace. See also Ross E. Cheit, Tort Litigation, Transparency, and the Public In-
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 This particular public view desire to ban secret settlements be-
comes less compelling when one considers that the enforcement of 
confidentiality clauses is inconsistent at best. Would any court truly 
prohibit an injured plaintiff from seeking psychological counseling af-
ter an injury, merely because of a broadly-worded confidentiality 
clause? If the plaintiff thinks she is barred from seeking therapy, 
even though she may not be in reality, the real concern is with her 
lawyer. Why did the lawyer fail to explain the practical ramifications 
of the clause to the client, or that enforcement is questionable at 
best? Here, awareness and education of lawyers can play a signifi-
cant role. Removing a settlement tool and upsetting the settlement 
dynamic in the name of vague concerns for the vulnerable assumes 
the worst. It may, in the end, remove the only real settlement tool a 
vulnerable plaintiff may have. 
E.   Government Entities Should Not Enter into Secret Settlements 
 The public view of litigation holds that governments should never 
enter into secret settlements because the state is a public entity be-
holden to the public.93 The public has a right to know what the gov-
ernment is doing. The government-as-party justification for a ban on 
secret settlements also hearkens back to the transparency arguments 
against secret settlements. If the government is a litigant using pub-
lic tax dollars, the government should not be allowed to bargain away 
confidentiality because the public has a right to know what the gov-
ernment is doing with the public’s money.94 The government is then 
not a normal party but a super-party in litigation, representing more 
than just an individual’s private interests. The private view of litiga-
                                                                                                                    
terest, 13 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 232, 272 (2008) (discussing a similar positive exter-
nality toward a modified secret settlement regime in the form of improving public data col-
lection). Blanca Fromm argues that this type of partial settlement disclosure regime might 
actually begin to operate as an informal system of precedent for lawyers. See Blanca 
Fromm, Bringing Settlement Out of the Shadows: Information About Settlement in an Age 
of Confidentiality, 48 UCLA L. REV. 663 (2001). Of course the benefits of any such model 
still depend on the lawyer’s ability to accurately interpret what may be ambiguous infor-
mation in a settlement agreement (i.e., “fault,” factual information, and monetary 
amounts). It is difficult to predict the utility of much settlement information without more 
background regarding the dispute under which it arose. 
 93. See Sedona Conference Working Group, The Sedona Guidelines: Best Practices 
Addressing Protective Orders, Confidentiality & Public Access in Civil Cases, 8 SEDONA
CONF. J. 141, 177 (2007) (recommending that, absent exceptional circumstances, settle-
ments with public entities should not be confidential, so as to adhere to the principle of 
transparency in government). 
 94. This is likely the motivation behind the Law Commission of Canada’s recommen-
dations that government defendants should not impose confidentiality provisions on set-
tlements with survivors of institutional abuse. See Law Commission of Canada, supra note 
91, at 410. The Report does not, however, call for a ban on secrecy but instead recommends 
placing control of secrecy in the hands of the plaintiff only. Curiously, there was no discus-
sion about the loss of value-creation to these same vulnerable plaintiffs if secret settle-
ments were removed from the settlement dynamic. 
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tion, however, would uphold the principles of party autonomy and 
party prosecution regardless of who the party is. Even the govern-
ment as litigant needs the discretion to keep some things secret. 
 Treating the government as a special party that would not have 
access to the option of secrecy in settlement creates a host of prob-
lems. First, most government entities already operate with some de-
gree of secrecy. It would be difficult and problematic to attempt to ca-
tegorize precisely which settlements are to be made public and which 
should be kept secret. What about cases involving sensitive matters 
of national security? What about cases of institutional abuse within 
government organizations? Do the victims not have the right to keep 
the settlement secret if they so choose? Must the settlement be dis-
closed just because the defendant is a government entity? And if so, 
does this further compromise settlement prospects? In many in-
stances, the government is the most formidable law firm with the 
most resources a party will ever encounter.  
 The public view of government litigation helps highlight one im-
portant fact–the settlement dynamic with the government as a party 
may be unique. If discretion is granted to the government to enter 
the lawsuit, to defend the lawsuit, or to settle the lawsuit, all in the 
public interest, why should the option of a secret settlement be disal-
lowed if is in the public interest? In fact, precisely because the liti-
gant is the government, there may be a variety of publicly available 
informational resources with which to gain far more access to settle-
ment information than with any other private entity. These informa-
tional resources may provide such data in a different form than the 
actual settlement agreement, but they would be no less revelatory. 
What is special about the agreement itself that it must be disclosed 
in its entirety? Using the public interest to restrict the government’s 
capacity to bargain in the public interest is a very odd dichotomy. 
 The real target of the public view’s concern of government-as- liti-
gant is the issue of informational disclosure of data that may be useful 
in the public domain. One must make a profound assumption to con-
clude that every settlement entered into by the government-as-litigant 
holds important data useful for the public domain. There are many 
acts a government undertakes each day that are shrouded in secrecy. 
Furthermore, a government performs many acts each day utilizing 
public funds. None of these acts are automatically reviewable by the 
public, automatically informative of anything the government has 
done or plans to do, or even automatically interesting or additive to the 
political conversation of the day. This is not secrecy for secrecy’s sake 
but administrative efficiency and delegated discretion.  
 Essentially, then, the banning of secret settlements by govern-
ment entities is no more than a signal of government distrust and an 
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institutionalized mechanism for government review by the public. 
Rather than enhancing the political conversation with its constitu-
ents, forced settlement disclosure may actually bind the hands of the 
delegated government body to get its job done efficiently, fairly, and 
in the interests of the public. The public view assumes as an immut-
able rule that it is never in the public interest to keep settlements se-
cret. Interestingly, this is more in keeping with what one might ex-
pect the private view of litigation to conclude about government in-
volvement in lawsuits. 
 In contrast, the private view simply treats the government as any 
other party, subject to the same rules and permitted to use the same 
settlement tools. In the end, this might prove to be the most efficient 
way to conceive of the government-as-litigator in the civil justice sys-
tem. Government informational disclosure requirements are, or 
should be, more than adequate to deal with the public’s thirst for in-
formation, for whatever reason, be it accountability concerns or me-
dia gossip. Removing secret settlements as an option for the govern-
ment so as to enhance governmental informational disclosure may 
actually cause the public more harm than good. Litigation may be-
come protracted, discretion fettered, the interests of the vulnerable 
not heeded, and the public may not know what to do with the infor-
mation even if it had it. Further yet, the public may misinterpret the 
information. In fact, all of the problems with the public view’s desire 
to ban secret settlements–transparency, public contribution, safety, 
and the vulnerable–are completely turned on their heads when the 
public itself is the litigator. Secret settlements are a litigation set-
tlement tool, not an informational prospectus. 
IV.   CONCLUSION
 The public view’s charge to ban secret settlements does not sit 
comfortably with much of what public view scholars want to see in 
the civil litigation system itself. Perhaps the most important final 
flaw in thinking of the civil justice system from the public view 
standpoint is revealed when extrapolating what would occur if secret 
settlements were actually banned for any one of the reasons cited by 
public view scholars. Banning secret settlements altogether may 
have absolutely no effect on the use of secret settlements in litigation 
because parties will just work around the ban.95 This is a decidedly 
                                                                                                                    
 95. Indeed, Scott Moss notes that while a ban on secret settlements would have an ef-
fect on the incidence of settling a lawsuit after it has been filed, there would be a resultant 
increase in settlements reached before the lawsuit is filed. While Moss notes that settle-
ments reached before a lawsuit is filed are most certainly cheaper to the litigation system 
in economic terms, it is difficult to predict the total net effect of a secret settlement ban be-
cause of the variety of factors and behaviors in the settlement dynamic. At the very least, 
Moss concedes that uncertainty costs prevent economic analysis of secret settlements from 
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private view result. A legislative ban on secret settlements may in-
centivize parties to opt out of the public justice system and into pri-
vate arbitration or alternative dispute resolution, where the ban may 
not apply.96 Disputing parties may forum shop or use contractual 
choice of law language to select a jurisdiction that allows secret set-
tlements.97 Parties may also agree to never file a suit with the public 
justice system.98 One could imagine a defendant demanding, as part 
of settlement negotiations, that the plaintiff dismiss the publicly filed 
lawsuit so that the parties negotiate beyond the shadow of the law al-
together, with secrecy as a possible bargaining chip once the dispute 
is completely outside the public system. What is the point of a ban if 
any party can still contract around the ban?99
 The civil justice system is built to favor settlement over trial. For 
the typical private law dispute, it is a system with values most com-
patible with the private view of litigation because the private view 
can accommodate some public view concerns in a nonlinear fa-
shion.100 It appears that the public view is far less effective at ac-
commodating private view concerns. To that end, it makes most 
sense to allow parties to bargain with secrecy if they see fit. Regula-
tion does no more than reduce opportunities for settlement and upset 
the dynamic of settlement negotiations and, in some cases, the very 
possibility of settlement at all. 
 In fact, by keeping secret settlements in effect for nonaggregate pri-
vate law disputes in the civil justice system, the private view’s 
strength is in its malleability at the system design level. One can focus 
on individual private concerns and often simultaneously meet public 
                                                                                                                    
providing a clear answer as to whether or not a total ban is beneficial. See Scott A. Moss, 
Illuminating Secrecy: A New Economic Analysis of Confidential Settlements, 105 MICH. L.
REV. 867 (2007). See also Depoorter, supra note 47 (noting the ambiguous effect that a ban 
on secret settlements would have on litigation behavior). 
 96. See, e.g., Sedona Conference Working Group, supra note 93, at 173; Luban, supra
note 4, at 2622 (arguing that if public courts cannot compete with private dispute resolu-
tion, litigants will switch to private providers). 
 97. See Drahozal & Hines, supra note 9, at 1481-82. 
 98. See id. at 1459 (proposing that parties could circumvent secrecy bans by settling 
before the claimant actually files a lawsuit). 
 99. Unless, of course, the legislative ban also prohibited contracting around the ban 
on secret settlements. This creates a host of enforceability and fairness concerns. What if, 
for example, it is perfectly appropriate in a highly sensitive case to keep the settlement a 
secret? Ontario’s recent experience with a blanket ban on contracting around limitation 
periods in section 22 of the Ontario Limitations Act, 2002 is a prime example of how statu-
tory enforcement can create chaos and confusion. In Ontario, the statute eventually had to 
be amended to provide greater clarity for citizens and reasonableness of result. Ontario 
risked losing commercial deals through forum-shopping to a jurisdiction that did not have 
such a ban on contracting behavior. See, e.g., R. John Cameron, New Limitation Periods—
Contracting in Ontario, 40 CAN. BUS. L.J. 109 (2004) (citing the problems with a ban on 
contracting around the newly enacted two year standard limitation period). 
 100. See Drahozal & Hines, supra note 9, at 1466-67 (arguing that secrecy in the litiga-
tion system makes settlements more likely). 
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interest concerns. For example, keeping secrecy as a viable bargaining 
tool can prompt creative settlement solutions that add unique value to 
the settlement. The obvious instances are when secrecy has a price for 
one party. The price paid to settle the case is higher if secrecy is part of 
the settlement package. In some instances, the entire settlement may 
be about secrecy. Remove the option to bargain with secrecy, and one 
removes the ability to settle some disputes. But keeping secret settle-
ments in the litigation system allows parties to use secrecy’s value in 
creative ways. For example, if one party values secrecy or if the control 
of information is important to both, the parties could add to the set-
tlement a jointly drafted press release. That is a nonmonetary solution 
that has a monetary value for one or both parties. Part of a settlement 
could also include negotiations concerning the issuance of a warning 
about a defective product or a product recall in exchange for secrecy. 
Such a settlement solution would satisfy a litigant’s desire to ensure 
that harm does not happen to a future consumer, while still protecting 
the litigant’s privacy.  
 The value of secrecy does not always have to be measured in dol-
lars. Parties could also negotiate for a policy change in an organization 
or workplace in exchange for secrecy. Again, the ameliorative effect of 
the settlement, so central to the public view of secret settlements, is 
not lost but is in fact enhanced by the addition of secrecy to settlement 
negotiations. The commodity of secrecy, unlike the commodity of mon-
ey, prompts creative settlement discussions such as these. There is 
nothing stopping parties from negotiating confidentiality clauses in se-
cret settlements that are tailored to the specific client’s future needs. 
Such needs could include therapy, the recognition of the therapeutic 
value of discussing some aspects of the results of the settlement, or the 
ability to disclose some information required to keep others safe while 
still respecting some private elements of the settlement. If secrecy is 
taken off the bargaining table, negotiations are invariably limited to 
money alone. Surely the public interest benefits more from any one of 
the above alternative settlement arrangements. 
 For these types of standard private law disputes, the private view 
of the civil litigation system thus fosters a more complete dialogue 
about how to balance rights of parties with the public interest in op-
erating a publicly funded and publicly available dispute resolution 
mechanism. However, because the public and private views operate 
on a nonexclusive, nonlinear continuum, the type of dispute may also 
control the perspective from which one views and reforms the system. 
A civil rights case or a class action may, by necessity, require some 
thinking more in line with the public end of the continuum.  
 In the secret settlement context for typical private law disputes, 
the limits of bargaining with secrecy are thus the limits of party-
driven imagination. If a party sees value in secrecy and the opposing 
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party sees value in disclosure, there is suddenly opportunity for val-
ue-creation in compromise. The price of secrecy does not always have 
to depend solely on the willingness of a party to pay for secrecy but 
may also depend on the creativity of a party in trading on secrecy. In 
a party-driven adversary system, most disputants with nonaggregate 
private law claims are made worse off by removing secret settlements 
from the landscape of civil litigation. Only the private view of the civ-
il justice system equips one to evaluate procedural reforms on, ironi-
cally, both private and public criteria. 
 By unpacking the criticisms of secret settlements, it becomes evi-
dent that the wholly public view arguments are problematic and re-
versible. This suggests that the public view, standing alone, may not 
be the best way to normatively design the civil justice system’s pro-
cedural mechanisms for standard private law disputes even if, in 
fact, one asserts that typical public values are of equal importance to 
private values. Perhaps, then, the public view is best thought of as 
operating on a nonexclusive continuum in conjunction with the pri-
vate view. At the same time, the private view of secret settlements 
does a better job of accommodating many public view concerns while 
still preserving the party-driven civil justice system in which party 
autonomy is currently of some import. The relationship between 
these two standpoints is likely thus complementary and nonlinear.101
This conception may prove helpful in informing future scholarly de-
bates about the procedural aspects of any kind of case, whether the 
bilateral private law dispute, the mass tort, or the class action. Scho-
lars should recognize that concerns that were previously thought of 
as belonging only to one camp of thinking are actually inversely often 
solved by the other perspective when the relationship between the 
public and private views is understood as something beyond opposi-
tional. The public can indeed inform the private, and the private can 
inform the public. In the end, the utility of the difference is not one of 
kind, but of degree. 
                                                                                                                    
 101. As opposed to bipolar, thus requiring a balancing or trade-off exercise, as Leder-
man argues is necessary when discussing the benefits of legal precedent versus settlement 
of civil disputes. See Lederman, supra note 3 at 268. 
980 FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 37:945 
